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It is around 5 years since my colleague, Tooraj Jamasb, and I reviewed the EU’s progress with 
electricity reform (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005). At that time many countries were still struggling to 
implement elements of the EU wide policy on electricity sector liberalisation that they had signed up 
to. Five years on, it is a good time to revisit the issue of how successful this wide ranging set of 
policies have been and to assess prospects going forward. 
 
The electricity sector over the last five years has assumed a higher public profile for a number of 
reasons. First, its leadership role in the decarbonisation of the economy has been highlighted 
following climate change concerns.  Second, the resurgence of the issue of energy security on the 
back of rising oil and gas prices and the perceived gas security threat to the EU from Russia has 
called into question the growing reliance of electricity on gas-fired generation plants. Third, there 
has been increased public consciousness of the cost of energy following significant rises in consumer 
prices. Fourth, the credit crunch has further raised concerns about the ability of the market to 
deliver the large quantities of investment which are predicted as being necessary to decarbonise the 
sector and to meet energy security concerns. 
EU electricity (and gas) liberalisation remains a formidable energy reform programme, unmatched in 
scale and depth in any other major region of the world. While other regions of the world have seen 
major pauses to their energy market reforms (most notably in the United States), the EU in the form 
of the European Commission, continues to press ahead. DG TREN has recently secured the passage 
of a ‘Third Package’ of energy market reforms, extending earlier reform packages in 1996 and 2003. 
Meanwhile DG Competition continues to provide significant support for the progress towards the 
creation of a single European energy market via vigorous pursuit of competition law enforcement in 
the area of electricity and gas, most notably via its Energy Market Inquiry. While individual 
governments demonstrate increasing ambivalence to the EU single energy market project, it 
continues to have significant central momentum. 
In this short update paper I want to review the latest evidence on progress with electricity 
liberalisation in the EU. I begin with a short review of the legislative background in Section 1. Section 
2 looks at the evolution of markets and trading in electricity across the EU. Section 3 outlines 
progress with the key reform elements. Section 4 examines market structure issues within the EU. 
Section 5 looks at the performance of the whole sector in recent years. Section 6 reviews company 
                                                          
1
 I was asked to write this article in celebration of the 10 year anniversary of the Italian Law and Economics 
journal, Mercato Concorrenza Regole. I would particularly like to thank the journal for the encouragement to 
return to a subject very much in line with both its and my own interests. The author particularly wishes to 
thank Pippo Ranci and participants at the 10 year anniversary conference of Mercato Concorrenza Regole held 
at FEEM for their help and encouragement. Alessandra Motz provided excellent research assistance. The 
author acknowledges the financial support of FEEM and of the ESRC Electricity Policy Research Group. An 
anonymous referee provided excellent comments. The usual disclaimer applies. 
2 
 
level performance. Section 7 discusses progress in reducing emissions and promoting renewables. 
Section 8 notes recent developments in electricity reform and Section 9 concludes. 
Section 1: The Legislative Background 
There have now been three substantive electricity directives (1996, 2003 and 2009) which have set 
out electricity reform policy across the EU (and been significant in setting policy in Norway and 
Switzerland). The most significant so far, in terms of driving policy to date, remains Directive 
03/54/EC. This laid out the path of reform in member states to December 2007. This Directive 
required the establishment of an independent regulatory agency for electricity in each member 
state. It strengthened the requirements for unbundling of transmission and distribution system 
operation from retail and generation activities and required free entry into the electricity generation 
market, thus strengthening the operation of a competitive wholesale market. It required market 
opening to competition of the whole electricity market, including for residential consumers. The 
Directive envisaged significant progress towards the completion of a single market in electricity 
services across the EU. We will discuss the third legislative package, enacted in July 2009, later in the 
paper. 
The theoretical basis of EU electricity reforms remains the theory of competitive markets. Thus the 
aim of European Commission is to increase the numbers of competing generation and retailing firms 
in each national market and to reduce the effective market shares of former monopoly incumbents. 
This involves reducing barriers to energy in both generation and retailing and increasing the effective 
size of the market from the national level to the whole of the EU, via the creation of regional 
markets made up of more than one country. There has also been an emphasis on incentive based 
regulation of natural monopoly transmission and distribution electricity networks, carried out by an 
independent regulator. 
The empirical basis for competitive EU electricity markets can draw on diverse experiences from 
around the world, including within the EU. The EU’s emphasis on vertical unbundling of networks 
from generation and retailing is based on the anti-competitive effects of continuing vertical 
integration (e.g. in relatively successful markets such as Chile, see Pollitt, 2004). Independent 
regulation has demonstrated its value in controlling the behaviour of incumbent monopoly networks 
(e.g. via the observation of what happens in the absence of incentive regulation, e.g. in New Zealand 
in the 1990s, see Bertram and Twaddle, 2006). Collusion (or gaming) remains a potential problem in 
markets where there is a lack of effective competition (e.g. in California, see Joskow, 2001). Entry 
barriers are a significant issue in some national markets (e.g. in France or Germany, see European 
Commission, 2007). Security of supply can be an issue where there is a lack of effective co-ordination 
across jurisdictions (e.g. the electricity blackouts in New York and Italy in 2003, see Bailek, 2004). 
These negative experiences suggest the value of vertical unbundling, independent regulation, 
wholesale and retail market competition, reduced barriers to entry and improved international co-
ordination: all of which have been strongly championed by the European Commission in the 
electricity sector. 
 
Section 2: EU Electricity markets and trading 
National electricity markets within the EU are extremely diverse in terms of size and mix of 
electricity generation, some examples are given in Figure 1. France depends heavily on nuclear 
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power, coal is significant in Germany, hydro is dominant in Norway and gas is relatively important in 
Italy and the UK. National markets vary in size from tiny (Luxembourg) to very large (Germany). 
 
Figure 1: National Electricity Supply by Source (GWh) in 2006 
 
Similarly, there is a wide variation in the degree of openness to international trade in electricity, as 
shown in Figure 2. Here we can see that trade remains small as a percentage of national 
consumption for most countries, though France, Germany and Italy are absolutely large in terms of 
their volumes of exports (and/or imports).  Countries such as Austria, Denmark, Luxembourg and 
Switzerland have significant, in relation to national consumption, transit flows of electricity. 
Figure 2: Imports and Exports of Electricity as % of national consumption (2006) 
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Although electricity trade remains low relative to trade more generally, Figure 3 shows that 
electricity trade as a percentage of consumption has been increasing since 1998. The figure looks at 
countries that are part of the UCTE synchronised system and therefore covers most of western 
Europe (the figure shows within UCTE trade and all trade including UCTE trade with non-UCTE 
countries). The trend rise reflects the fact that the differences in national endowments of electricity 
generation capacity and in national patterns of demand should give rise to significant trading 
opportunities as liberalisation progresses.  
Figure 3: Cross Border Electricity Exchanges as a % of total consumption (UCTE system) 
 
Source: UCTE Statistical Yearbook 2008, p.138.
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Although the European Commission’s policy is aimed at creating a single European electricity 
market, what has emerged is a set of regional electricity markets (see Eurelectric, 2004). The oldest 
of these is Nord Pool which pre-existed the recent electricity directives, but did add Denmark in 
1998. Germany and Austria were linked via the EEX in 2002. An Iberian market of Portugal and Spain 
was created via Omel in 2004. France, Belgium and Netherlands formed Belpex in 2006. A market 
covering France, Belgium, Netherlands, Germany and Austria seems likely to emerge soon. Ireland 
and UK will form a single market once a planned interconnector is built between them. Progress is 
being made on a South East European electricity market which would involve Romania, Bulgaria and 
Greece as well as Albania, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Montenegro and Serbia (see Pollitt, 2009). 
 
Section 3: Key reform steps 
Electricity reform can generally be thought of as having four main elements: privatisation of publicly 
owned electricity assets; the opening of the market to competition; the extension of vertical 
unbundling of transmission and distribution from the generation and retailing; and the introduction 
of an independent regulator. These steps are inter-related. EU reforms have focussed on the last 
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three elements and have not explicitly addressed the issue of privatisation. However the pressure to 
unbundle and to introduce competition necessarily introduces non-nationally publicly owned 
electricity companies as competitors or as new asset owners, thus undermining the rationale for 
continuing state ownership of former monopolies. Figure 4 illustrates the progress with privatisation 
in some EU countries. It illustrates a strong move away from full public ownership towards more 
private involvement, but also how few countries in the EU have full private ownership of electricity 
assets. 
Figure 4: Electricity Privatisation Timeline by Country 
 
In terms of market opening to competition the 2003 Directive mandated full retail market opening 
by the end of 2007. Table 1 illustrates the fact while most countries did technically meet the 
deadline, very few were compliant with it in 2006. This suggests significant amounts of nominal 
market opening for residential customers by 2007. However as Jamasb and Pollitt (2005) pointed 
out, given the starting point in 1996, this represents a very significant forcing effect of EU Electricity 
Directives. 
Table 2 illustrates the extent of network unbundling in 2008. The table shows that while most 
countries had adopted the European Commission’s preferred approach of ownership unbundling of 
the transmission system operator (TSO), both Germany and France had not done so. The table also 
shows that public ownership is very significant in transmission for many countries, indicating a 
reluctance on the part of governments to relinquish control of this central part of their national 
electricity system. Table 2 also shows the wide diversity of scales in distribution companies (DSOs) 
and that many of these remain legally integrated with retailing (as is allowed if they have less than 
100,000 customers).  
Table 3 illustrates the progress countries have made with introducing an independent national 
electricity regulator. Here, following Jamasb and Pollitt (2005), we score the regulatory agency 
according to five characteristics which are indicative of its independence from central government.  
Source: OECD international regulation database, 2009
1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007
Austria
Belgium
Czech Rep.
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Poland
Portugal
Slovak Rep.
Spain
Sweden
UK
Public Mostly Public Mixed Mostly Private Private
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A score of 5 indicates the highest level of independence. We find that of the countries we examined 
in 2005 only Germany shows a marked improvement in its score, having belatedly created an 
independent regulator for electricity in mid-2005. Somewhat surprisingly, only 5 countries examined 
have the top score, indicating a significant lack of autonomy on the part of ‘independent’ regulatory 
agencies. 
Finally, it is interesting to put electricity reforms in the context of utility sector reforms more 
generally across the EU. Wolfl et al. (2009, p.26) compare 9 industries (including electricity, gas, rail 
and telecoms) in terms of liberalisation score (0 being the most liberalised and 6 most restrictive). It 
is interesting to observe that electricity now has a reasonably low average score (1.9), but the 
highest variance (+/- 0.8), indicating the wide variation in degree of liberalisation across EU 
countries. By contrast telecoms, generally recognised to be the leading liberalised utility sector, has 
a lower average score (1.3) and virtually no national variance (+/-0.2). 
Table 1: Proportion of the retail electricity market open to competition (%) 
 
  
2006 2007
Austria 100 100
Belgium 87.4 100
Bulgaria 60 100
Cyprus 30.8 31.8
Czech Republic 100 100
Denmark 100 100
Estonia 13 12
Finland 100 100
France 69 100
Germany 100 100
Greece 70 90.1
Hungary 37.09 22.29
Ireland 100 100
Italy 73 100
Latvia 76 100
Lithuania 74 74
Luxembourg 84 100
Netherlands 100 100
Poland 80 100
Portugal 100 100
Slovakia 80 100
Slovenia 75 100
Spain 100 100
Sweden 100 100
United Kingdom 100 100
Source: EC Benchmarking Report (2009)
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Table 2: Extent of network unbundling across the EU 
 
Table 3: Powers of the Electricity Sector Regulatory Agency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scoring: Type of regulation, Ex Ante=1, Ex Post=0; Network Access conditions set by regulator =1, 
Other=0; Dispute Settlement by regulator=1, Other=0; Ministry involvement, No=1, General only=0.5, 
Yes=0; Information powers, strong =1, Other=0.  
 
Source: Derived from EC 3
rd
 Benchmarking Report (2004), updated. 
  
Ownership 
unbundling of the 
TSO
Public 
ownership
Private 
ownership Nr. DSOs
% DSOs legally 
unbundled
Application of 100,000 
customers exemption
% DSOs with less than 
100,000 customers
Austria No 51 49 130 8% Yes 92%
Belgium No 35.55 64.45 26 100% No 54%
Bulgaria No 100 0 4 100% No 25%
Cyprus No 100 0 1 0% Yes 0%
Czech Rep. Yes 100 0 280 1% Yes 81%
Denmark Yes 100 0 101 100% No 95%
Estonia No 100 0 40 3% Yes 98%
Finland Yes 12 88 89 56% No 93%
France No 84.8 15.2 148 0% Yes 97%
Germany No 0 100 855 18% Yes 91%
Greece No 51 49 1 0% No 0%
Hungary Yes 0.1 99.9 6 100% No 0%
Ireland Yes 100 0 1 0% No 0%
Italy Yes 30 70 163 * Yes 93%
Latvia No 0 100 10 10% Yes 90%
Lithuania Yes 96.6 3.4 7 29% Yes 71%
Lux. No 32.8 67.2 9 22% Yes 89%
NL Yes 100 0 8 100% No 63%
Poland Yes 100 0 18 78% Yes 22%
Portugal Yes 51 49 13 85% Yes 77%
Romania Yes 100 0 30 23% Yes 73%
Slovakia Yes 100 0 154 2% Yes 98%
Slovenia Yes 100 0 1 100% No 0%
Spain Yes 20 80 329 100% Yes 98%
Sweden Yes 100 0 175 100% No 90%
UK Yes 0 100 18 100% No 22%
Source: EC Benchmarking Report (2009)
*Obligation of legal unbundling for companies serving more than 100,000 clients in force since th 1st January 2008
Score /5
Germany 0
Denmark 3
Greece 3
Netherlands 3
Spain 3
Luxembourg 3.5
Finland 4
France 4
Sweden 4
Austria 4.5
Italy 4.5
Belgium 5
Ireland 5
Portugal 5
UK 5
Norway 5
3 
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Section 4: Market Structure 
The need to create a properly functioning EU wide or regional electricity market is well illustrated by 
a look at the market structure of national electricity markets in Europe for both wholesale 
generation and retail. Somewhat surprisingly, the EU does not collect data on the degree of 
concentration of the whole EU market or on its various regional electricity markets. Figure 5 shows 
the continuing dominance of former monopoly generators in national wholesale markets. Market 
shares of above 20% for the largest generator might be considered a cause for concern. Of the major 
national electricity markets only the UK has a largest generator with less than 20% market share, 
while in France the market share of EdF is above 80%. While dominance is not the same as ‘abuse of 
dominance’ under competition law, what this data suggests is that - in the absence of significant 
break-ups - significant international competition, via international transmission interconnectors, is 
required if former incumbent generators are to face effective competition within their national 
markets. 
The question of whether the current wholesale market situation is anti-competitive has been 
examined closely by the European Commission’s Energy Sector Inquiry. A major focus of their 
investigation was on the efficient use and building of interconnector capacity and the Inquiry 
concluded there were competition issues surrounding a lack of international interconnector capacity 
(European Commission, 2007).Table 4 suggests that in many national markets effective international 
competition is likely to be hampered by significant congestion on most of the largest interconnectors 
between countries with significant incumbent market shares, with some interconnectors congested 
almost all of the time.  
In national retail markets the picture of patchy competition is similar. Here a competitive retail 
market might require, as a minimum, the top three retailers to have combined market shares of less 
than 60%. Figure 6 shows that in many EU countries the market share of the largest three retailers is 
significantly more than 80%. These figures may underplay the problem given that that the market 
share of the largest retailer may be much greater than one third of the total market share of the top 
three. Given that retail markets are inevitably more local than wholesale markets, it is quite clear 
that healthy competition would require actual market share loss at the national level by incumbents, 
to a greater extent than might be the case in wholesale markets. It is difficult to avoid the 
conclusions that most residential retail markets are some way short of being competitive. 
Healthy national retail competition might be indicated by active consumer switching. The evidence 
on consumer switching is somewhat patchy as shown in Table 5. In 2007 of the reported countries 
only Sweden seems to have had a very active household market with switching rates above 10%. 
Many others have switching rates of 0%. Only Sweden had higher switching rates for small industry 
and households higher than for medium sized industry. By contrast the UK had a switching rate of 
19.1% for small industry and households in 2007 (EU Benchmarking Report, 2009, Technical Annex, 
p.7). Low switching rates do not necessarily indicate that consumers are being exploited. They may 
however indicate that household tariffs continue to be subject to some form of price control, which 
coincidently reduces the attractiveness of the small customer market to non-incumbents (as in 
France and Belgium).  
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Figure 5: Market Share (%) of the Largest Generator (2008) 
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Source: Eurostat and own calculations
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Table 4: Congestion on international electricity interconnectors 
 
Source: European Commission (2007, Part 2, p.173). 
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Figure 6: Market Share – Three largest Retailers (2008) 
 
 
Table 5: 2007 switching rates in different countries (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ERGEG data
0 20 40 60 80 100
Norway
Slovak
Finland
Romani
Poland
German
Italy
Austria
Slovenia
Ireland
Hungary
Lux.
France
Latvia
Bulgaria
Czech
Estonia
Portugal
Cyprus
Albania
Lithuania
Country In large industry
In medium-
sized industry
In small 
industry and 
households
In the whole 
retail market
Austria 7.3 2.1 1.5
Bulgaria 48.6 1.1 0 12.7
Cyprus 0 0 0 0
Czech Rep. 6 3 0.1 0.8
Denmark 20.8 6.4 13.7
Estonia 0 0 0 0
Germany 13.2 9.7 4.2 10
Greece 0 0 0 0
Italy 1.2 7 4 4.6
Latvia 0 2 0 1
Lithuania 0 0 0 0
Luxembourg 29.1 0.4 0.2 15
Poland 17 0.1 0 7.8
Portugal 14.1 5.2 7.2
Romania 6.2 7.1 0.9
Slovakia 0 0 2
Slovenia 0 6.5 4.5 3.6
Spain 10 22 3 10
Sweden 8.7 8.7 10.4 9.1
Source: ERGEG data, 2008
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Section 5: Sector Performance 
We begin our look at the performance of the electricity sector under liberalisation with an 
examination of performance at the EU and national levels. We need to start by defining what a good 
performance at the sector level might look like. We suggest that a good performance at the sector 
level would in general involve the following elements: falling prices, price convergence, improved 
use of available capacity, increased labour productivity, a more diversified resource base and no 
deterioration in security of supply. 
A fall in average electricity prices excluding taxes across the EU, relative to an appropriate 
counterfactual, would indicate that liberalisation was delivering generally lower prices as a result of 
greater efficiencies and competition. This would also involve convergence in prices towards the 
average as a result of efficient trading. There might be some rebalancing of individual prices to 
better reflect underlying relative costs as implicit cross-subsidies are eliminated (e.g. between 
commercial and industrial customers). Tariffs would be expected to become more response to 
fluctuations in underlying commodity prices (i.e. more volatile). More efficient use should be made 
of reserve capacity, leading to a fall in reserve margins. These trends would affect the wholesale and 
retail components of electricity prices. Regulated network tariffs should fall in real terms as 
independent regulation leads to tougher price controls. These measures focus attention on more 
efficient pricing, costs and use of capacity. A healthy EU wide market might also be characterised by 
a more diversified resource base as gas replaces coal (stimulated by new entry) and more 
renewables are added to the system (as a result of renewable support mechanisms). Finally, in 
contrast to the fears raised during the blackouts of 2003, we would want the electricity system to 
exhibit no significant increase in the risk of blackouts following electricity liberalisation. 
Some evidence on the above is given below. 
5.1: Changes in price levels and price dispersion 
Figure 7 shows that EU average prices (excluding taxes) did fall in real terms for each of three major 
consumer groups, at least until 2003. It is hard to tell if this is a good performance in the absence of 
a counterfactual which takes account of fluctuations in underlying commodity prices for coal and 
gas. Some evidence that there was initially some price benefit from liberalisation is given in Figure 8 
which shows US vs EU electricity prices. It does appear that residential and industrial customers in 
the EU were doing relatively better than those in the US between 1999 and 2005, but less well since 
then. However the US dollar has depreciated significantly against the Euro over the period and this 
may be masking the improvements in the EU. 
Figure 9 suggests that there has been some price convergence across EU countries (excluding taxes), 
especially for large industrial customers. This trend is particularly marked between 1998 and 2003 
when the variation significantly for both residential and industrial customers. Interestingly the 
degree of convergence between residential and industrial customers has become more similar. 
Overall the picture is one of convergence where prices have been free to converge. This suggests 
that where competition has been effective there has been an increase in convergence, but that this 
is by no means widespread. This picture of price convergence in electricity prices compares very 
13 
 
favourably to general price level convergence trends across the EU-15, where there was almost no 
price convergence over the 1997-2004 period.
3
  
Figure 10 looks at the variation in national prices in more detail. It shows that there continues to be 
significant divergence in network charges between countries (compare Hungary and Poland) and in 
taxes and levies on electricity (compare Denmark and Czech Republic). While there is some evidence 
that linked markets have similar wholesale electricity prices (e.g. Denmark and Germany). Clearly 
there is some way to go before all of the elements that make up final prices in national markets 
converge to levels that could reasonably be explained by small underlying differences in efficient 
costs. 
Figure 7: EU-15 Final Electricity Prices per KWh (2007 Euros) 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
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 See 
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=en Accessed December 14
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Figure 8: US vs EU Electricity Final Prices excluding taxes adjusting for exchange rate (1999 = 100) 
 
 
Figure 9: EU-15 Price Convergence in national average prices excluding taxes  
(Annual coefficient of variation) 
 
Source: Eurostat. 
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Figure 10: Estimated electricity price breakdown excluding taxes (2008) 
 
Source: EC Benchmarking Report (2009). 
 
5.2: Effects on capacity utilisation 
On the efficient utilisation of available generation capacity, it is now difficult to get a consistent 
measure of this across the EU, due to the increase in intermittent renewable generation capacity. 
This renders conventional measures of peak demand relative to maximum available capacity an 
unreliable measure of the true state of supply and demand balance within national markets 
(because maximum available capacity is conditional on weather conditions which are not necessarily 
co-incident with demand peaks). The figures for peak demand and maximum available capacity, 
seem to suggest that on the face of it the supply and demand balance has improved between the EU 
3
rd
 Benchmarking Report (2004) which reported figures for 2003 and the latest figures for 2007 (EU 
Benchmarking Report, 2009, Technical Annex, p.43). 
5.3: Labour productivity effects 
Figures 11 and 12 give the evidence on labour productivity improvements in the electricity sector. 
Figure 11 gives the more general context. While the average labour productivity improvement for all 
industrial sectors was around 5% for both five year periods 1995-2000 and 2000-2005 across the EU-
15, in the electricity, gas and water subsectors, the improvement was more than 20% for each five 
year period. This performance was mirrored across most of the individual countries, with some 
variation as to the timing of the delivery of efficiency gains depending on the starting point for 
reforms. Thus early reformers, like the UK, show relatively better performance in the first five year 
period. By contrast later reformers, such as Ireland, show relatively better performance for the 
second five year period. Electricity liberalisation has clearly had a significant effect in the area of 
sector level efficiency. Figure 12 confirms that, for the countries for which comparable data is 
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available, the figures for electricity, gas and water are representative of the effects at the electricity 
only level. 
Figure 11: Labour productivity in electricity, gas and water 1995-2005 
 
Source: EU KLEMS database:  Output per hour worked (LP_I). 
 
Figure 12: Labour productivity in electricity supply 1995-2005 
 
Source: EU KLEMS database:  Output per hour worked (LP_I). 
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5.4: Impact on diversity of generation sources 
Table 6 shows the trend in the diversity of electricity generation resources since 1994. There has 
been a reduction in the degree of concentration of generation by type, mainly as a result of rising 
renewables and gas generation. This is in line with predictions as to the impact of EU policies, though 
the effect is somewhat masked by the transition from EU-15+Norway to EU-27+Norway between 
2004 and 2006. 
Table 6: Market shares and Herfindahl index for generation sources in EU-15+Norway 
 
 
5.5: Impact on security of supply 
Yu and Pollitt (2009) discuss the evidence on the impact of electricity liberalisation on the incidence 
of newspaper reported blackouts in Europe. They find that for the period 1998-2007 there is no 
evidence of a statistically significant increase in the number of newspaper reported blackouts 
correlated with the degree of liberalisation. They do however suggest that there is limited evidence 
that the risk of large multi-country blackouts has increased as a result of increased cross-border 
trade in electricity. However blackout probabilities remain low and responsive to better 
international co-ordination (Bailek, 2004). 
Overall, the picture is of mixed progress at the sectoral level towards the desired effects of 
electricity liberalisation at the EU and national level. 
 
Section 6: Firm level performance 
Next we examine the performance of the electricity sector under liberalisation from the perspective 
of firm performance. When it comes to firm performance we are considering good performance in 
the context of what might be best for society. Thus we might say that a good performance for 
society at the level of the firm would involve the following: a more competitive market structure; 
1990 1994 1998 2002 2006*
Coal 37.1 32.0 27.9 26.2 28.6
Oil 9.0 8.4 7.8 5.6 3.9
Gas 6.9 9.5 14.7 17.3 21.1
Biomass 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.9 2.7
Waste 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.9 n.d.
Nuclear 33.4 34.9 34.2 31.2 29.5
Hydro 12.8 13.8 13.1 16.6 9.2
Geothermal 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Solar PV 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7**
Solar thermal 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other sources 0.1 0.2 0.5 1.0 1.1
HHI 2781 2589 2339 2271 2242
* EU-27 + Norway
** Includes solar thermal generation
Source: IEA and Eurostat data
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increased merger activity to exploit efficiency gains; and levels of profitability consistent with 
supporting required investments. We have already observed the very significant improvements in 
labour productivity at the national sector level (and by implication at the level of the sector’s 
constituent firms). 
6.1: Market shares 
Assessing trends in market structure at the level of the EU is difficult due to a lack of reporting of 
data. Jamasb and Pollitt (2005) reported evidence of significant market share increases in generation 
by RWE, E.ON and Vattenfall in the period 1998-2002. If anything market shares, at the whole EU, 
level in generation have consolidated since then due to the take-overs of National Power, Scottish 
Power and Electrabel. This may not of itself be an issue for likely firm performance if the offsetting 
efficiency savings and increased trans-European rivalry results in lower costs and lower prices. 
Looking at competition in supply the picture is even less clear. EdF, ENEL, E.ON and RWE report 38m, 
32m, 22m and 14m electricity customers in their latest annual reports. If the total number of EU 
electricity customers is around 250m (a rough estimate) this suggests that around 40% of EU 
electricity customers are served by 4 companies. This would not be problem if each of the four firms 
was equally present in all markets. If this were the case it would represent a significantly liberalised 
retail electricity market. However each of the top four companies remains heavily concentrated on 
its home market (France, Italy, Germany and Germany respectively) resulting in the high market 
shares in individual national markets noted earlier. 
6.2: Merger activity 
Figure 13 shows the pattern of merger activity in the EU electricity sector between 2000 and 2009. 
This shows that there has been very significant merger activity, as might be predicted following 
liberalisation. The highlighted boxes show mergers which have the result of increasing vertical 
integration, either within the electricity sector or by electricity companies acquiring gas company 
assets. Vertical mergers have the result of reversing the unbundling intentions of the EU electricity 
directives (even though they may be cross-border or cause bundling which did not previously exist). 
As such they may create significant barriers to unbundled new entrants such as stand-alone 
generation companies or retailers. Clearly the merger activity in the sector is very significant and 
requires closer monitoring by competition authorities, especially as the number of remaining 
companies declines. 
6.3: Firm profitability 
An examination of the performance of an index of European electricity stocks against an index of 
general stocks (over the period January 1992-June 2009) addresses the issue of the financial 
performance of the electricity sector over the liberalisation period
4
. The evidence suggests that 
while electricity stocks did underperform during the early period of liberalisation (1996-2000) as the 
EU electricity directives were transposed into national legislation, there is no evidence of 
underperformance in the most recent period. Electricity stocks, if anything, finish the period ahead 
of the all stocks index. This suggests that the financial performance of the industry has not been 
unduly impacted by reform, and there is no suggestion of a fundamental financing problem with the 
sector. 
                                                          
4
 See http://www.stoxx.com/indices/benchmarking.html. 
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Figure 13: Electricity Sector: M&A deals by type of purchaser and acquired company 
 
 
6.4: Econometric evidence on reform effects 
Sections 5 and 6 present the raw data evidence on sector and firm level performance under 
liberalisation. Econometric evidence, over earlier sample periods, confirms the general trends we 
identify with respect to wholesale and final prices and costs. Thus Steiner (2001), Hattori and Tsutsui 
(2005) and Fiorio et al. (2007) find evidence of productivity improvements. These papers also find 
weak evidence on price benefits. de Silva and Soares (2008) present evidence of wholesale price 
convergence across national markets. However these country level studies suffer from the inability 
to satisfactorily measure reforms as a package, largely falling back on adding up or separating out 
individual reform elements (e.g. privatisation or vertical unbundling). 
Other evidence, such as Copenhagen Economics (2005), shows stronger performance in leading 
reform countries (such as the UK and Norway) at both the micro-economic and at the whole 
economy level. As noted earlier, comparison of reform elements reveals that in contrast to the 
leading reform sector, telecoms, there is some way to go in electricity reform implementation in 
many EU countries (Wolfl et al., 2009). 
  
Company active 
(also) in the gas 
sector
19 11 10 116
Integrated 
company or gen 
+ distr + sales 
company
12 0 3 84
Gen + distr or 
gen + sales 
company
0 0 1 2
Distribution 0 20 2 31
Generation 45 0 18 183
Generation Distribution
Gen + distr or 
gen + sales 
company
Integrated 
company or gen 
+ distr + sales 
company
Source: elaborations on M&A Database, REF Ricerche per l'Economia e la Finanza
Purchaser
Ac
qu
ire
d 
co
m
pa
n
y
20 
 
Section 7: Progress in reducing emissions and promoting renewables 
An increasingly important part of EU electricity policy focuses on the environmental effects of the 
sector. This policy is expensive and is beginning to impact on overall costs and prices. However it is 
beginning to show significant performance effects. The policy began with a focus on mitigating the 
national and regional pollutants such as sulphur oxides and nitrous oxides (SOx and NOx), before 
moving on to Greenhouse Gases (such as CO2). In parallel the EU has developed targets for 
renewable energy with the aim of increasing renewable electricity generation. These 20-20 targets in 
2020, essentially target a 20% reduction in CO2 on 1990 levels by 2020 and a renewable energy 
share in total energy consumption of 20% by 2020. These targets imply even more substantial CO2 
reduction targets and renewable generation share targets from the electricity sector given the 
relative ease with which progress towards the targets can be achieved in the electricity sector as 
opposed to transport and heat sectors to 2020. 
Figures 14 and 15 show that there has been a significant degree of progress on SOx and NOx 
reductions for the 19 countries listed. Overall SOx emissions from power stations fell 74% and NOx 
emissions fell 44% between 1990 and 2005. Figure 16 shows that, on CO2, progress has been less 
impressive with a total fall of only 3% between 1990-2006 for the 19 countries listed. This can be 
attributed to the failure of the EU emissions trading system for CO2 to restrict CO2 quantities and 
hence give high enough CO2 prices to incentivise decarbonising the electricity sector. 
On renewables, overall progress has been slow, in part due to the declining share of large scale 
hydro in the overall electricity mix. For the EU-15+Norway+Switzerland the rising share of 
renewables such as wind has just managed to replace declines in hydro, as shown in Table 7. Figure 
17 shows progress towards the EU’s 2010 national targets for renewable electricity (under Directive 
2001/77/EC). Progress by 2006 was significantly behind target in major EU countries, with only 
Germany, looking like it might meet its target. National targets for 2020 are framed in terms of 
renewable energy (rather than just electricity), as illustrated in Table 8 (under Directive 2009/28/EC). 
These targets seem just as likely to be missed with the largest EU countries – Germany, France, Italy, 
UK and Spain – all having gaps of more than 10% between their 2006 share of renewable energy and 
their 2020 targets.  
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Figure 14: Power sector SOx emissions 
 
Figure 15: Power sector NOx emissions 
 
 
Source: OECD Environmental data (2009)
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Figure 16: Power sector CO2 emissions 
 
Table 7: Renewable electricity share (%) of electricity generation EU-15+Norway+Switzerland 
 
  
Source: European Environment Agency (2009)
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 Figure 17: 2010 targets for renewable electricity generation
Table 8: Renewable Energy Targets for 2020
Source: DG TREN (2009)
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The EU’s policies on decarbonisation and on renewables seem likely to have serious implications for 
liberalisation of wholesale and retail electricity markets. If decarbonisation leads to more nuclear 
power or the widespread use of carbon capture and storage plants this will imply increased financial 
barriers to entry and reduced flexibility in the operation of large scale generation. This will 
strengthen the power of incumbent generators and possibly lead to further consolidation in 
wholesale and by implication retail electricity markets. 
An increased share of renewables in the generation mix will lead to higher volatility in electricity 
supply and marginal prices. In parts of Northern Europe, wind output volatility already poses a 
significant grid management challenge. It will also create significant financing challenges for both 
renewable and conventional generators who may receive unreliable signals for investment from the 
short run balancing market. Further integration of the EU market as a whole will certainly help 
manage these problems in aggregate but may not be enough to forestall increasingly large 
interventions in the market to support the financing of capital intensive low carbon investment 
projects. 
 
Section 8: Recent developments in EU electricity reform 
Two recent developments indicate both the state of electricity reform to date and some likely 
directions that it might take in the future. The EU Energy Sector Inquiry (begun in 2005) was 
completed in January 2007 by DG Competition (European Commission, 2007). This confirmed that 
there were ‘serious competition problems’ with the EU electricity market. The Inquiry concluded 
that there was a basis for further action and that the Commission intended to pay serious attention 
to future merger proposals (particularly those involving electricity and gas assets) and to state aids 
to the sector. There was also a commitment to vigilance on the possibility of collusion between the 
major European electricity companies. The Commission concluded that vertical integration between 
generation/supply businesses and network businesses was a problem and hence that ownership 
unbundling of transmission assets was desirable. There was an issue of access to the transmission 
grid, particularly cross border where electricity and gas did not always flow in the direction 
suggested by market price differentials even when capacity was available. 
In the light of the Energy Sector Inquiry, DG TREN proposed a third legislative package on electricity 
and gas market reform in September 2007. This strengthened the legislative support for unbundling 
by recommending ownership unbundling of transmission assets, with an independent system 
operator model (ISO) with continuing transmission wire asset integration as an alternative. Asset 
sales to parties outside the EU would be restricted to those countries with similar unbundling 
requirements (this would restrict Russian purchases of EU electricity and gas assets).  A European 
wide regulatory agency would be established, with binding decision making powers, to complement 
national energy regulators. There would be requirements for increased independence of national 
regulators. A new European network for transmission system operators would be established and 
there would be greater transparency towards network operation and supply. 
The requirement for ownership unbundling of transmission met with the most national opposition. 
France and Germany proposed an economically efficient unbundling (EEU) option. This would 
involve a legally separate TSO within an integrated group, a compliance officer to ensure operational 
separation of the transmission business and restrictions on movement of staff between business 
units. This has been included in the final Directive 2009/72/EC. 
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However in the meantime, the EU Energy Sector Inquiry, prompted voluntary proposals to sell off 
transmission assets (as of October, 2009): E.ON have offered to sell their electricity TSO and some 
4.8 GW of generation capacity. Vattenfall have offered to sell their electricity TSO. RWE have offered 
to sell their gas TSO, but not their electricity TSO. These proposed sell-offs have been postponed by 
the credit crunch but represent attempts by the companies to reduce the risk of future competition 
authority action. They fall some way short of ensuring full ownership unbundling in the main central 
European regional market, but they will provide important evidence going forward on the impact of 
unbundling (particularly on costs, entry and security of supply, all of which it was initially suggested 
would worsen if forced unbundling occurred). 
Both of these developments suggest that further progress is likely as a result of European 
Commission action in pushing nation states towards a more competitive electricity market. 
 
Section 9: Conclusions 
It is difficult to briefly summarise the result of a simultaneous economic policy experiment carried 
out across 27 countries. While some European countries have made substantial progress towards 
competitive electricity markets (e.g. the UK, Sweden and Finland), others have some way to go (e.g. 
France and Germany). However there are a number of general conclusions that may usefully be 
drawn at this stage. 
First, there has been an impressive forcing effect of successive EU electricity directives. Market 
opening has proceeded rapidly across the EU. There has been a standardisation of market rules and 
regulation and widespread acceptance of what constitutes best practice. 
Second, there have been some notable market impacts. These include significantly increased EU 
cross-border trade in electricity, improvements in the quality of regulation, impressive labour 
productivity gains, some price falls (relative to the counterfactual) and a degree of price 
convergence. 
Third, the market remains incomplete and significant competitive concerns have been identified by 
the European Commission. Prices have risen and diverged since 2003 and there seems to be 
continuing market power being exercised by incumbents and concerns that mergers may be 
increasing this. 
Fourth, a positive social cost benefit analysis of reforms at the EU level is still difficult to call. 
Consumers were seeing lower prices and convergence but this trend has been partially reversed. 
Profits of EU electricity firms have not suffered unduly due to the introduction of competition. The 
impact on government in terms of increased government efficiency, reduced subsidy and improved 
tax revenue is not clear, but there is no clear evidence that governments have suffered welfare 
losses due to electricity reforms. 
Fifth, significant new challenges to the liberalisation agenda have emerged. These include concerns 
about security of supply both as a result of rising quantities of intermittent renewables on the 
system and also about the reliability of Russian gas deliveries to the EU (following Russia’s gas 
disputes with Ukraine) and hence whether ‘energy security’ should be left to the market. They also 
arise from an ambitious EU climate change policy and its requirement to move towards rapid 
decarbonisation of the electricity sector. This has raised issues of whether national support 
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mechanisms for low carbon generation can be made to mesh with a competitive wholesale 
electricity market. 
Finally, high commodity prices and the rising costs of renewables have raised issues of energy 
poverty and the extent to which governments need to intervene in the pricing of residential 
electricity to protect poor consumers. 
What might the next five years of EU electricity market development bring? Will liberalisation 
continue to advance or will it go into reverse?  
On the side of advancement, there has already been significant progress with reform and significant 
supportive action via the Energy Sector Inquiry and the Third Legislative Package. The Single Market 
remains a powerful intellectual and political imperative for the EU, from which it would seem 
difficult to extract electricity markets. Indeed many of the future challenges facing the EU on climate 
change and renewable can only be sensibly addressed in the long run with a functioning EU wide 
electricity (and emissions) market.  
On the other hand, progress with (and support for) electricity reform is limited in many EU countries 
and the evidence of obvious gains weak. It is also clear that liberalised electricity markets face 
significant climate and renewables targets and that energy security is a growing issue. In these 
circumstances the capacity for accidental or intentional ending of progress towards a fully functional 
EU wide wholesale and retail market would seem to be high. 
What is certain is that at the national level there will be scope for significant divergences of policy on 
electricity liberalisation, even within a generally supportive EU framework. As is already the case, 
policy divergence will largely be driven by national levels of commitment to competitive energy 
markets (and indeed to competition more widely). 
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